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Part III
New Roles for Retirement Assets

Chapter 9
The Impact of Pensions on Nonpension
Investment Choices
Leora Friedberg and Anthony Webb
Workers have experienced a major shift in pension coverage over the last
two decades, with US employer-provided defined contribution (DC) pen-
sions displacing traditional defined benefit (DB) pensions. At the time, the
rate of stock market participation among US households escalated. The DB
and the DC plans differ in how risks are allocated to workers and firms and
in the degree to which workers are exposed to financial decision-making.
This chapter documents the investment choices of workers outside their
company pensions, focusing on a sample of respondents to the Health and
Retirement Study (HRS). In what follows, we first discuss the long-term
trends in pension structure and stock market participation by households.
Next, we discuss the risks involved in DB and DC pensions and theoreti-
cal predictions about their impact on behavior; following this, we review
related literature. Subsequently, we present our estimation strategy, data,
and estimation results, and conclude with a discussion of directions for
future research.
Motivation
Employer-provided DC pensions including 401(k) plans have displaced
traditional DB pensions for many US workers over the last two decades.
Among full-time employees with a pension, DC coverage rose over 1983–98
from 40 to 79 percent, while DB coverage dropped from 87 to 44 percent
(Friedberg and Webb 2005). During the same period, the rate of stock
market participation among US households escalated, jumping from 32
percent in 1989 to 49 percent in 1998 (Bertaut and Starr-McCluer 2000).
While the proliferation of DC plans explains part of the overall increase
in stock market participation, it also rose for other households.1 Hence,
of special interest is how investment choices outside of worker pension plans
changed over time.
This shift in pension structure has transformed the environment in
which workers make most of their life-cycle saving decisions. In times
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gone by, employers offering DB plans made all investment choices and
bore risks associated with those choices. Today, employees generally make
investment choices and bear the associated risks in DC plans. For instance,
an unexpectedly high rate of return helps employers with DB plans and
workers with DC pensions. Conventional theory suggests that workers with
DC plans, bearing more investment risk, should invest more conservatively
outside of their pensions than workers with risk-free DB plans. Yet DB plans
have traditionally imposed substantial risks as well. The promised benefit is
often not fully guaranteed until the worker nears or reaches retirement,
so the DB pension risk should also influence workers’ willingness to bear
nonpension investment risk, especially since it is likely to be correlated with
salary risk they bear.
The allocation of household nonpension portfolio risk may also be influ-
enced by other pension risks. One possibility is that the proliferation of
DC pensions raised stock market participation outside of pensions, perhaps
by helping households overcome barriers to stock market participation
(Poterba 2001; Weisbenner 2002). Another factor to consider is taxes.
Rational investors are believed to do best when they put taxable assets in
DC plans where they are taxed less heavily (Bergstresser and Poterba 2004).
Especially for those in higher tax brackets, the same pretax rate of return
earned on bonds will be taxed more heavily than that earned on equity. On
the other hand, equity historically has a higher average pretax return, so
predictions about the optimal location of assets may be ambiguous. We will
consider what the evidence reveals about these effects.
Our research provides a key ingredient for understanding the impact
of pension structure on overall wealth accumulation. Many researchers
have analyzed how people make investment choices in DC plans. However,
data from pension plan managers and employers does not allow one to
analyze the resulting impact on nonpension wealth. Another branch of
research has used data like ours from the HRS or the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF) to study how the presence or amount of wealth in pen-
sion plans relates to the amount of nonpension wealth. Little attention
has been given, though, to understanding the effect of pensions on the
allocation of nonpension wealth. By influencing rates of return and the
subsequent need to save, the allocation of wealth determines total wealth at
retirement. Poterba et al. (2005) laid out the impact of allocation choices
in DC plans on retirement wealth and expected utility while treating the
allocation of nonpension wealth as exogenous. Their work demonstrates
the importance of understanding responses to risk that alter other wealth
holdings. The question of whether the structure of pensions lead people
to make offsetting choices in the allocation of their nonpension portfolio
will drastically affect conclusions about the impact of pensions on overall
wealth at retirement.
9 / The Impact of Pensions on Nonpension Investment Choices 181
It is also important to understand these effects for several additional
reasons. First, our results shed light on the overall impact of major changes
in the pension environment, since DB pension coverage continues to
plummet for young workers and in newer jobs. Second, there is increasing
attention to how the shift in pension risk may alter other behavior such as
retirement patterns. The extent to which real actions are taken to offset
such risk is governed by the opportunities to make other portfolio adjust-
ments. Third, the shift in pension structure may provide new insights about
the importance of constraints on portfolio allocation. Finally, some reform
proposals recommend replacing at least a portion of traditional Social
Security benefits with personal accounts. The latter may raise wealth if
they earn a higher return than the 2–3 percent real return by which social
Security benefits would be reduced (President’s Commission to Strengthen
Social Security 2001). Yet if participants responded to this change by
reallocating their nonpension portfolios away from equities, much of the
anticipated risk diversification benefit might disappear. At the other
extreme, events like the collapse of Enron have led to calls to reduce the
amount of risk to which workers are exposed in their pensions.
Predictions from Economic Theory
From a theoretical perspective, DB and DC pensions differ in crucial
ways. Figure 9-1 shows the path of pension wealth accrual in two such
plans drawn from the HRS.2 Pension wealth here is defined as the real
discounted present value of the worker’s expected future pension benefits,
if the job ends at the age shown on the horizontal axis. In this section,
we first describe differences in the risks associated with the accrual of
pension wealth in both types of plan shown in Figure 9-1, and then we offer
predictions about the impact of those risks on optimal portfolio choices.
We also discuss theoretical considerations about voluntary contributions,
which are often difficult to identify in practice.
Risk Characteristics of Pension Plans
The DC pensions are relatively simple to explain: contributions go into an
account which earns a market return. The account is portable after vesting
(usually immediate or within two years), so workers can ‘roll over’ or take
their funds with them as a lump-sum, when they leave their job. Some DC
plans are invested entirely in company stock or another risky asset, while
many allow some choice in how to invest their funds. While the nature
of the investment risk varies to some extent across plans, workers bear
the investment risk in all DC plans. Thus, the path of DC pension wealth
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Figure 9-1. Pension wealth accruals in typical pension plans, 1992 HRS.
Notes: Employer-provided pension wealth is defined as the real present value of
expected future employer-provided pension benefits, if the employee leaves the
job at the age shown on the horizontal axis. Pension wealth accrual, shown on the
vertical axis in thousands of dollars, is the change in pension wealth if the employee
works one additional year and then leaves the job. (Source: Adapted from Friedberg
and Webb (2005).)
accrual shown in Figure 9-1 is not actually known in advance, but is in fact
uncertain.
The DB pensions offer a defined payout to workers at retirement. The
benefit is typically an annuity that is a proportion of either the worker’s
average or final salary, with the proportion often increasing with tenure.
In the United States, corporate employers are obligated to prefinance
promised benefits in a manner that is financially sound, so they bear the
resulting investment risk.3 The DB plans are not actually riskless, of course;
the path of DB pension wealth shown in Figure 9-1 is ‘spiky’, which makes
DB pension wealth highly vulnerable to the risk of early departure, in con-
trast with portable DC pensions. Losses from early exit arise because bene-
fits depend on nominal, not real, earnings; because of nonlinear effects of
job tenure on the nominal benefit; and because of vesting provisions. The
risk of losing one’s pension because of early departure from a job shrinks
as tenure increases, both because expected pension wealth is realized and
because uncertainty over future contingencies may diminish. Accordingly,
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the pension risk in DB plans diminishes over time, while the investment
risk in DC pensions remains.4
How Pensions Affect Optimal Portfolio Choice
In a standard model of portfolio choice without frictions, risk-averse indi-
viduals choose an optimal combination of expected return and undiversi-
fiable capital market risk that depends on their degree of risk aversion. All
other risk that arises from investing in capital markets can be diversified
away by making investments that have negatively correlated risks. What
if people face risk in their income streams as well as their investments?
This ‘background’ income risk is generally viewed as being undiversifiable,
and it will generally reduce the amount of risk that people are willing to
absorb in their financial assets. Labor income is considered a major source
of background risk.
The full impact of risky pensions will depend on the nature of those
risks. As noted, DB and DC pensions are both subject to background risk
from uncertain future earnings highly correlated with labor income risk,
and DB pensions are subject to additional background risk due to possible
early departure from the job. Given that, paying workers with a risky flow in
either the form of a pension or its equivalent in cash would, at the outset,
induce similar effects on portfolio choices. However, since these sources
of background risk diminish over time, this could boost the risk people
are willing to adopt outside their pension. This prediction is stronger for
DB pensions because of the diminishing risk of early departure and the
accruals of DB wealth that workers experience as tenure increases. Besides
that, DC pensions carry investment risk. Giving a worker a risky DC plan
instead of a safe DB plan should lead to offsetting behaviors elsewhere.
To sum up, if workers make optimal portfolio choices, then we expect
that workers holding risky assets in their DC plans should adopt more
conservative investment strategies outside their pensions, and workers with
DB plans should adopt accordingly less conservative strategies.
The Effect of Pensions on Optimal Portfolio Choice with Frictions
Recent behavioral economics studies have suggested that many US house-
holds do not invest in equity markets at all, even if equity is recommended
theoretically as a key element of any optimal portfolio in the absence of
a risk-free asset. Explanations for barriers to stock market participation
include costs of participation, whether financial, informational, or psy-
chological. A related piece of evidence is that stock market participation
jumped in the 1990s, perhaps because the proliferation of DC plans played
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a role in surmounting some barriers to participation. If households face
an up-front cost of learning how to invest or acquiring information, then
DC plan participants with investment choices can overcome that barrier. In
point of fact, DC participants are usually offered information about invest-
ment choices such as risk characteristics and past performance of different
types of mutual funds, and they can learn from observing performance
over time. Even being given an investment such as company stock without
choice may raise awareness about the operation of financial markets. More-
over, some employers seek to boost DC participation in order to comply
with tax law by offering financial education, which has been shown to lift
contributions to retirement accounts (Bernheim and Garrett 2003; Duflo
and Saez 2003).5 Weisbenner (2002) found some evidence of this, where he
concluded that households with DC plans permitting investment choices
were more likely to hold equities and held a higher share of equities outside
of their plans, than otherwise similar households in DC plans that did not
permit such choices.
Taxes
The portfolio allocation problem gains an additional dimension when
considering DC plans, since assets held in such accounts are taxed lightly.6
Investors should therefore locate assets that are taxable at the highest rates
in DC plans, subject to liquidity constraints. The same pretax rate of return
earned on bonds tends to be taxed more heavily than that earned on
equity, especially at higher tax rates, though the tax differential was much
greater in 2004 than in 1992.7 On the other hand, equity historically has a
higher average pretax return than bonds. Thus, we might observe different
nonpension portfolio allocations for people with DB versus DC plans for
tax-related reasons. The differential in tax rates should encourage the con-
centration of bonds in DC plans and equity outside, while differential rates
of return would lead to offsetting effects. However, research by Bergstresser
and Poterba (2004) indicates that tax minimization is not a major driver of
DC versus non-DC allocations.
Voluntary Contributions
A final consideration is that some DC plans allow voluntary contributions,
and in some cases these are matched by an employer. In a frictionless world,
if we observed voluntary contributions, we would predict that workers
would continue to offset the riskiness of their pension wealth elsewhere
in their portfolio. In a world with barriers to stock market participation,
on the other hand, observing voluntary contributions to a risky asset
reveals important information. If such contributions were not otherwise
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encouraged by matching employer contributions or tax preferences, it
provides additional support for the notion we discussed earlier—that DC
pensions offer a less costly way to invest in risky assets. Additional motiva-
tions from taxes or employer match rates that subsidize such investments
mitigate this argument, but not fully. Unfortunately, it is difficult to observe
voluntary and matched contributions in the HRS. Below, we highlight what
we can infer in our estimation approach.
Related Literature
One important set of papers relevant to our topic analyzes the theoretical
effect of various risks on portfolio choices and real behaviors in a life-cycle
setting. Many recent papers have analyzed the impact of adding undiver-
sifiable ‘background’ income risk to the household problem, including
Kimball (1991) who shows that an increase in income risk in a static
framework reduces an agent’s willingness to bear investment risk, even
when the risks are independent. The implication is that, when a risky DC
plan replaces a safe DB plan, individuals who also face background risk
should seek safer assets outside of their pension. Background risk also can
induce agents to take other actions. For instance these features reduce
both consumption and investment in the risky asset (cf. Koo 1998, 1999) in
simulations of dynamic models with income risk and borrowing constraints.
Viceira (2001) incorporated exogenous retirement, while Chan and Viceira
(2000) allowed labor supply to vary endogenously, which mitigates but does
not eliminate the demand for hedging when stock and labor income shocks
are positively correlated.8
It should be noted that much of the theoretical literature on optimal
allocation in the face of background risk focuses only on financial assets. We
extend the focus to pension wealth, which is facilitated by our recognition
that pension risks closely resemble risks in either labor income or financial
wealth. We will follow the lead of others and ignore housing and self-owned
businesses, but some features of our analysis reduce concerns along those
lines. Flavin and Yamashita (2002) showed that introducing housing can
cause substantial differences in optimal stock holdings over the life cycle,
but age-related heterogeneity is not a major problem in our sample of
older workers. Also, households with closely held businesses are less likely
than others to have pensions at all because they are disproportionately self-
employed.
Limitations of Empirical Research
Empirical researchers have avoided estimating a full life-cycle problem like
those laid out in the theoretical literature, focusing instead on testing
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limited implications. One reason is that actual behavior departs from
theoretical predictions in important ways. Many papers have assessed the
magnitude of departures from theoretical predictions, but the explanations
for them remain highly unclear. A common finding is that stock market
participation is far too low (King and Leape 1987) and that individuals
actively rebalance their portfolio far too infrequently (Ameriks and Zeldes
2004), relative to theoretical predictions. Explanations have focused on
barriers to stock market participation, which we alluded to earlier. For
example, Vissing-Jørgenson (2002) found that stock market participation
is persistent and that the frequency of trades increases with income, which
may indicate the importance of fixed per-period participation costs.
Another problem is the nature of available data, which limits the scope of
empirical analysis. Some studies use data from financial companies, occa-
sionally longitudinal, but they lack information on nonpension behavior
or on many household characteristics that affect financial behavior. Other
studies use the SCF, which collects detailed wealth data for repeated cross-
sections. The first panel to collect detailed asset data was the HRS. We use
data from the HRS, but we use it cross-sectionally because of measurement
error. Measuring changes in asset values magnifies the difficulties involved
in measuring asset levels, which are already subject to substantial misre-
sponse and nonresponse in survey data.9
Empirical Research on Portfolio Behavior
To study portfolio allocation, we are particularly interested in studies that
focus on DC pension plans and other assets together, and those that focus
on the impact of risk. In the former category, Uccello (2000) noted that
401(k) participants with a DB plan were more likely to invest their 401(k)
assets in equities, as compared to those without a DB plan. While the alloca-
tion of pension and nonpension investments is endogenous, she controlled
for the allocation of nonpension investments to stocks. In what follows, we
extend the focus to the determinants of non-DC investments. Poterba and
Samwick (2003) carefully estimated the impact of marginal tax rates on the
allocation of assets to tax-deferred accounts [including 401(k) plans] and
other accounts, though not on allocations within tax-deferred accounts.
Below, we follow many of the details of their empirical specifications. In
addition, Bergstresser and Poterba (2004) studied whether tax consider-
ations appear to drive allocations in and out of DC plans. While people
with DC plans in our data hold more equity outside of their pensions than
people with DB plans, Bergstresser and Poterba showed that people with
DC plans in the SCF also hold more equity in their DC accounts, and
that DC and non-DC allocations are typically quite similar. Since relatively
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small reallocations would be required for many households to achieve tax-
efficient portfolios, their work suggests that tax minimization does not drive
DC versus non-DC allocations.
A separate group of papers found that measures of ex ante risk or
ex post outcomes of risky processes influence portfolio choices. Guiso et al.
(1996) showed that higher self-reported labor income risk is associated with
smaller holdings of equity in Italian data. Vissing-Jørgenson (2002) found
that higher volatility in nonfinancial income is associated with a reduced
share of assets in the stock market, and Souleles (1999) reported similar
effects of consumption volatility. Vissing-Jørgenson did not find, however,
that the correlation of income and stock market returns influenced alloca-
tions. Below, we directly extend this literature by analyzing the impact of
exposure to pension risk on portfolio choices.
A few recent papers have analyzed risk-taking in the HRS. Goldman
and Maestas (2005) found that households that are more likely to have
Medigap policies to supplement Medicare, and thus face reduced risk of
out-of-pocket medical expenditures, are more likely to invest in risky assets.
Benítez-Silva (2004) estimated that work flexibility, as measured by the ease
with which one can alter one’s work hours, raised holdings of equity in the
HRS. He interpreted the results as showing that those who can self-insure
their labor income by adjusting hours of work are more willing to take on
other risks. Our analysis on pension risks, which are substantial, extends
these results.
Empirical Research on Other Effects of Risk
Several studies have analyzed the impact of recent stock market fluctuations
on retirement, with very mixed results. Gustman and Steinmeier (2002)
estimated a structural model of retirement and saving in the HRS with
stochastic rates of return, but they did not model portfolio choices. Coron-
ado and Perozek (2003) found that the stock market run-up led to earlier-
than-planned retirement in the HRS. Other papers specifically exploited
variation in exposure to stock market risk through DC pensions. Hurd and
Reti (2001) and Coile and Levine (2004) did not find evidence of an effect
on retirement, while Sevak (2005) did.
Methodology and Estimation Strategy
As we have noted, DB and DC pensions carry different risks and oppor-
tunities. DB pensions grow relatively less risky over time, so we expect to
see a gradual increase in exposure to risk outside of DB pensions. On
the other hand, the proliferation of DC plans may have helped to boost
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stock market participation in the 1990s. Next, we describe our approach to
studying these effects.
Econometric Specifications
Using cross-sectional data from the first wave of the HRS, we will investigate
the impact of pension type on the riskiness of nonpension investments.10
Specifically we examine the probability of holding equities in nonpension
financial assets and the share of nonpension financial assets allocated to
equities.11 The estimation is based on an underlying latent variable model
in which s∗ indicates the desired share of assets allocated to equity but is
subject to censoring at the endpoints of 0 and 1, as follows:
s∗i = Xi‚ + εi
si = 0 if s∗i < 0, si = s
∗
i = Xi‚ + εi if s
∗
i ∈ [0, 1], si = 1 if s∗i > 1
Here, X consists of pension characteristics and other explanatory variables
that may affect portfolio choices, as we discuss later. A Tobit specification
assumes that the probability density function f(εi) ∼ N(0, Û2). A Probit
specification assumes the same thing and estimates the likelihood of si > 0
versus si = 0, in which case Û2 is not identified.
Identifying the Effect of Pension Risk
In order to distinguish the effects of pension risk, we control for both the
type of pension and years in that type of plan, and whether DC plans offer
investment choices. We remain concerned, though, about unobserved fac-
tors that may be correlated with pension characteristics and undermine
inference about the effect of pension risk on portfolio allocations. For
example, workers who are relatively risk-tolerant may sort into jobs with
risky DC plans, or workers who are more likely to leave a job early may
prefer a job that offers a portable DC plan and may also be more risk-
tolerant. Unfortunately, we lack instruments for pension characteristics, so
we will take other steps to address concerns about unobserved heterogene-
ity. We will focus on a relatively homogeneous sample of workers with a
pension (as in Weisbenner 2002). People without a pension differ in many
dimensions—they have lower income and wealth and are less likely to be
working full-time. Many are retired, and retirement may cause portfolio
changes that confound the analysis. We therefore also control for answers
to HRS questions about tolerance for risk.
We remain hesitant to ascribe a causal interpretation to the estimated
effect of pension type on stock market investment, however. Concerns
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about endogenous selection into pension type are exacerbated by the
recognition that participation in some DC plans is voluntary. Ideally, we
would either omit DC plans that were purely voluntary, or focus on DC
eligibility rather than DC participation, or else use information on volun-
tary contributions to gain insight about preferences for risky investments.
Unfortunately, we cannot readily identify voluntary contributions to DC
plans in our data, and we are not confident that we observe all those
who are eligible but do not participate—that is, we can verify nonpartic-
ipating eligibles whose employers report another pension, but we must
rely on individual reports for nonparticipating eligibles who report having
no other pension. This issue will compound the problem of unobserved
heterogeneity in risk preferences.
On the other hand, the possibility of endogenous selection of workers
into pension plans works in our favor in identifying years-in-plan effects.
Our hypothesis is that workers will take on more nonpension risk the longer
they stay in a DB plan. Endogenous mobility would confound inference
of such an effect if workers with a greater tolerance for risk stay longer
in jobs with DB plans. However, this is the opposite of what follows from
our arguments above—we expect workers with less tolerance for risk to
choose DB plans and to stay in them longer. Therefore, concerns about
endogenous mobility would bias against finding evidence supporting our
hypothesis, and any effect that we observe would underestimate the true
effect.
Empirical Evidence
Our empirical analysis sheds light on these issues by investigating the
investment allocations of workers with DB or DC pensions. The Health
and Retirement Study reports detailed data for a large sample of older
Americans on wealth holdings and on pension plans. We use data from
1992 and 2004 to compare workers with different types of pension plans,
and we incorporate information on the number of years workers have been
in their pensions. This allows us to distinguish effects on stock market
investment that are present immediately from effects that emerge as time
in the plan increases. If DB pension wealth were riskless, then workers
with DB plans would be expected to take on more risk elsewhere in their
portfolios. Viewing DB pensions more accurately as risky, but declining in
risk as tenure increases and DB pension wealth becomes more certain, then
workers with DB plans should take on more risk over time. In our empirical
results, we observe this effect—stock market participation is significantly
higher as years in a DB plan rise, relative to years in a DC plan. We confirm
in our 1992 data that DB pension wealth at risk diminishes rapidly as
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workers age through their 50s. We also find that years spent in either type
of plan reduce stock market investment in 2004 when compared to 1992.
This suggests a jump in the perceived risk of both types of pensions. This
is not surprising given both increasingly common reports of underfunding
of DB plans, and also recent experience with stock market volatility among
DC plan holders in 2004.
The HRS surveyed households with at least one spouse aged 50–60 in
1991. Analyzing a large sample in this age range is useful, since they are in
their peak saving years and most likely to be making active decisions about
the allocation of wealth. We focus on the original HRS cohort in 1992,
when it was aged 51–61, and we replicate some of the analysis for the War
Babies (WBs) and Early Baby Boomers (EBBs) cohorts using 2004 data,
when those cohorts were aged 51–62. The key advantage of data from 1992
is that the HRS also obtained information from employers about pension
coverage at the time, as we describe below. Similar data is lacking for the
later cohorts in 2004.12
Investment Data
The HRS collected data on specific assets through questions of the follow-
ing type, which asked in 1992 about equity holdings:
For the next few questions, please exclude any assets held in the form of IRA and
Keogh accounts. Do you have any shares of stock in publicly held corporations,
mutual funds, or investment trusts?
Respondents were then asked the total amount invested in assets of this
kind. Similar data were collected on other types of financial assets including
holdings of any kind of bonds (comprising ‘corporate, municipal, govern-
ment, or foreign bonds, or any bond funds’) and liquid assets (comprising
‘checking or savings accounts, or money market funds’, and, ‘certificates
of deposit, government savings bonds, or Treasury bills’). Data were also
collected about the balances of IRAs and Keoghs, but not about their asset
allocation until 1998, so we have excluded them.
An important feature that distinguishes the HRS from many other data-
sets is the degree to which it sought to obtain at least some information
from people who refused to answer these questions in full. When respon-
dents said they had an asset but refused to provide its value, they were
prompted to reveal the range in which the value lay. The HRS used the
range data to impute dollar amounts for both partially and completely
missing responses. We use the imputed values when actual values were not
obtained.
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Pension Data
The HRS offers two sources of data about pensions. People were asked
in detail about their pensions, and in 1992 they were also asked to give
permission for the HRS to contact their employer to get plan information.
The HRS obtained plan descriptions from employers of 65 percent of
workers who said they had a pension.13
It turns out that many people are surprisingly unfamiliar with details of
their pensions. Gustman and Steinmeier (1999) underscore that people
confuse even the type of pension they have: among the 48 percent of their
employers reporting that they offered only a DB plan, 56 percent of the
workers in such a plan described it as DB, while 15 percent described it
as DC, and 27 percent said they had both types. Mistakes were similarly
high among employers reporting that they offered only DC plans or report-
ing both types. This raises the question of how to use these two sources
of information: much more accurate employer-reported (ER) data for a
smaller, and possibly selected, sample; and much less accurate individual-
reported data for the full sample. Complicating the situation, only workers
report key variables for our analysis—how long they have been in their
plans and whether they have investment choices in DC plans. For our 1992
sample, we try various combinations of self- and employer-reported data on
pension type and pension wealth, motivated by the recognition that even
incorrect beliefs can affect behavior.14 Chan and Stevens (2004) found that
inaccurate information about pensions affects retirement decisions, as does
accurate information among those who are well-informed. For the 2004
sample, of course, we can only use self-reported data.
Other Data
We include other explanatory variables that are expected to influence
portfolio choices. The HRS asked questions about preferences for risk-
taking. Individuals were first asked,
Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family, and you have a good
job guaranteed to give you your current family income every year for life. You are
given the opportunity to take a new and equally good job, with a 50-50 chance it will
double your family income and a 50-50 chance that it will cut your family income
by a third. Would you take the new job?
After answering yes or no, they were asked a similar question proposing
either a more or less risky gamble. We explored different parameteriza-
tions of this information, but the controls for risk aversion are statistically
significant in only some of our empirical specifications. People may have
difficulty processing this somewhat complicated hypothetical.15 Therefore,
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the responses may not capture the full range of heterogeneity in risk
preferences.
Our other control variables are relatively standard. As in other studies,
we control for noncapital income and wealth. Because labor income and
pensions both comprise a part of compensation, we control separately for
labor income and for other noncapital income and separately for employer-
provided pension wealth and for other components of net nonpension
wealth. While net nonpension wealth may be endogenously determined by
past portfolio choices, it is commonly included and has strong explanatory
power. It is justified by, among other things, the possibility of fixed costs of
participation, since higher wealth makes it easier to surmount such costs.
Employer-provided pension wealth is defined here, differently from Figure
9-1, as the expected present value of benefits if a worker stays in a job until
age 65.
We can control for information about current health status and about
life expectancy until ages 75 and 85, with the latter capturing information
about the value to individuals of annuitized DB pension income versus
unannuitized DC lump-sum payouts. Finally, we will include demographic
variables (age, marital status, gender, and educational attainment) that
influence life-cycle behavior.
Sample Selection
We concentrate on the effect of men’s pensions, and we treat the household
as the decision unit. On the whole, men are much more likely to have
a pension in the original HRS cohort—about 40 percent of our 1992
sample has a wife with a pension, and wives’ pension wealth is relatively
low. Studying wives’ pensions, as well as household decision-making more
generally, is complicated by evidence from our other research; for instance,
Friedberg and Webb (2006) show that the spouse with higher earnings has
more influence over major household decisions, and moreover that women
with more influence invest significantly less in the stock market.
Of the 7,607 households interviewed in the HRS cohort in 1992, we
focus on those in which a male is working (4,138 households); and among
those, men who are not self-employed and who report having a pension
(2,271); and among those, households that report the data discussed above
(1989); and among those, households with positive net nonpension wealth
(1950).16 Of the 6,034 households interviewed in the WB and EBB cohorts
in 2004, we employ the same criteria, focusing on those in which a male
is working (2,010), the male is not self-employed (1,550), the household
has positive net nonpension wealth (1,461), and the male reports having
a pension (1,019). For our main sample of 1,950 in 1992, 1,343 were
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matched to ER data. As we noted earlier, we will make use of pension
data reported both by workers and, when available, their employers. Of
those 1,343, some 706 of the workers (or 51%) knew their pension type
(categorized as DB-only, DC-only, and DB and DC)). Mistakes can be
of several types. Fully 11 percent of the matched sample are completely
confused, reporting DB-only when the plan is DC-only or vice versa; 19
percent are somewhat confused, reporting both types when they only have
one; and 18 percent are absentminded, reporting one type when they have
both.
Characteristics of the Sample
Tables 9-1 and 9-2 reports summary statistics for our full sample and rel-
evant subsamples. Table 9-1 shows summary statistics for the full sample,
divided by self-reported (SR) pension type; and for the subsample that has
matched employer data, divided by ER pension type. Table 9-2 reports key
financial statistics (excluding IRAs and Keoghs, as mentioned earlier) for
additional subsamples.
There are two notable patterns that emerge among the pension and
financial variables of interest in the 1992 sample. First, people with DC
plans (with or without a DB plan as well) had a greater likelihood of
investing in equities than did people with only a DB plan. Among those
in the SR data with a DB-only plan, 28.9 percent owned stock outside
their pension, compared to 38.1 percent of those with a DC-only plan and
47.7 percent with DB and DC plans. For the matched subsample using ER
data, the overall differences were less stark (34.3% for DB-only, 40.4% for
DC-only, and 39.3% for DB and DC); while for those in the matched sample
who knew their pension type (as shown in Table 9-2), the differences were
a little more stark (26.6, 42.9, and 52.6). Conditional on investing, though,
there was little difference in the share of financial assets allocated to
equities.
The second key pattern is that, among those with DB plans in 1992, the
likelihood of investing in equities rose with years in the plan. Table 9-2
distinguishes among those in DB plans for 0–10 versus 11+ years for self-
reported samples (since, importantly, only SR data reports years in a plan).
For workers in DB-only plans, 23.4 percent in their plan for 0–10 years
invested in equities versus 30.7 percent in their plan for 11+ years. For
workers in DB and DC plans, the differences (by years in the DB plan)
were 41.8 and 49.9 percent.
As our results in the next section confirm, the two key patterns described
above persist when we control for covariates in the estimation. This is
important because of disparities in some sample characteristics shown in
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Table 9-2 Financial Characteristics of Various Subsamples
% Owning Stock Stock/Financial Wealth Most
Risk Averse
All If Own Stock
1992 Full sample, by self-reported (SR) pension type (N = 1,950)
DB-only (820) 28.9 15.4 53.2 70.9
0–10 yrs 23.4 12.4 53.1 68.5
11+ yrs 30.7 16.3 53.2 71.6
DC-only (530) 38.1 19.8 52.0 63.0
0–10 yrs 35.3 17.8 50.6 60.6
11+ yrs 44.1 24.0 54.3 68.2
DB and DC (600) 47.7 25.5 53.6 66.7
DB 0–10 yrs 41.8 23.1 55.3 66.1
11+ yrs 49.9 26.4 53.0 66.9
Employer reports a pension, by SR pension type (N = 1,343)
DB-only 34.3 17.9 52.3 70.0
DC-only 40.4 22.4 55.5 57.9
DB and DC 39.3 21.6 55.0 72.6
SR/ER pension type agrees (N = 706)
DB-only 26.6 12.8 48.2 72.2
0–10 yrs 16.4 7.6 46.4 65.6
11+ yrs 28.8 13.9 48.4 73.6
DC-only 42.9 24.3 56.8 52.2
DB and DC 52.6 29.9 56.9 68.2
DB 0–10 yrs 48.7 28.2 57.9 66.7
DB 11+ yrs 53.6 30.4 56.7 68.6
SR/ER pension type disagrees a little, by SR pension type (N = 505)
DB-only 27.4 15.1 55.1 76.0
DC-only 39.3 19.9 50.7 75.4
DB and DC 46.0 25.2 54.7 63.4
SR/ER pension type disagrees a lot, by SR pension type (N = 143)
DB-only 34.3 19.0 55.3 68.6
DC-only 35.6 19.8 55.5 76.7
2004 Full sample, by self-reported (SR) pension type (N = 1,109)
DB-only (284) 37.3 22.1 59.2 60.6
0–10 yrs 29.9 22.0 73.8 59.7
11+ yrs 40.1 22.1 55.2 60.9
DC-only (443) 37.7 23.7 62.8 58.0
0–10 yrs 35.3 21.5 60.8 58.4
11+ yrs 42.0 27.7 66.0 57.3
DB and DC (382) 45.3 27.6 60.9 55.0
DB 0–10 yrs 43.9 26.1 59.4 52.0
11+ yrs 46.4 28.9 62.2 57.4
Notes: See Table 9-1. Definitions: SR—self-reported pension data. ER—employer-reported
pension data. Disagree a little—person misreports DB-only or DC-only as DB and DC, or
misreports DB and DC as DB-only or DC-only. Disagree a lot—person misreports DB-only
as DC-only or vice versa.
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Table 9-1. People who had both types of pensions were richer—with higher
earnings, pension wealth, and net worth—than people with one type, and
people with DC-only plans were richer than people with DB-only plans. It
is crucial to ascertain that it was not higher wealth that drove greater stock
market investment.
In addition, the highest degree of risk aversion is observed for those in
DB-only plans and the lowest for those in DC-only plans—so this is partly,
but not completely, correlated with the pattern in stock market investment,
raising concerns that workers who were more tolerant of risk selected into
riskier pensions. On the other hand, risk aversion was a little higher among
those who have been in their DB pensions the longest. This supports the
argument we made earlier that there may be endogenous mobility of the
less risk averse out of DB and into DC plans—which would bias downwards
the estimated effect of years in a DB plan. Still, the range of variation in
risk aversion across pension types was only moderate, with 63–71 percent
of each type reporting the highest degree of risk aversion.
Some additional features are noteworthy. The share of the 1992 sample
in Table 9-1 who has a wife with a pension is generally similar, at 40–
46 percent for each pension type, and it is highest for the DC-only group.
This reduces concerns that about our choice to focus mostly on men’s
pensions. In addition, people in DC plans with choice invested substantially
more in the stock market, as did people who had been in their DC plans for
longer. These differences related to choice and to years-in-plan for those
with DC plans are not sustained when we include other covariates in the
estimation, though.
Finally, note that DC pension coverage rose considerably for the 2004
cohort, compared to the 1992 cohort. In 2004, 74 percent of our sample
had a DC plan, compared to 58 percent in 1992. In parallel, DB coverage
dropped to 51 percent in 2004, down from 73 percent in 1992. While
stock market investment at the ages that we focus on did not change much
between 1992 and 2004, the differential across pension types narrowed,
with a substantial increase among those with only a DB plan and slight
decline among those with DC plans. The similarity of conditional stock
market investment across types of plans persists, as does the differential
by years in a plan.
Taxes
Before proceeding to discuss estimation, we will briefly mention evidence
about the potential impact of tax minimization on our analysis. As we noted
earlier, nonpension portfolio allocations might differ for people with DB
versus DC plans simply for tax-related reasons. On the other hand, results
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from Bergstresser and Poterba (2004) suggested that tax efficiency does not
seem to play a major role in affecting DC versus non-DC allocations. We
find corroborating evidence in the HRS by considering sample selection
criteria that parallels that of Bergstresser and Poterba. Beginning with our
sample of 1950 in 1992, we select households with nonpension financial
wealth of at least $25,000, pension wealth of at least $25,000, and access
to a DC plan that allows them to choose the allocation of their assets. The
resulting sample of households who are likely to have much to gain from
tax minimization consists of only eighty-three observations. Such a small
number will have little effect on our overall analysis.
Estimation
The multivariate estimation models described next test whether pension
type and years in a plan influence the riskiness of nonpension investments.
First, we discuss our simple Probit and Tobit estimates for the main 1992
sample; next, we turn to estimates for additional 1992 and 2004 subsamples;
and finally, we discuss robustness checks for the variables used in the basic
specification. For Probits we report estimated marginal effects, showing the
impact of a marginal change in a covariate on the likelihood of investing in
the stock market; for the Tobits, we report estimated coefficients, showing
the impact of a marginal change on the ‘desired’ percentage s∗i of nonpen-
sion financial wealth invested in the stock market.
Main 1992 Sample
Table 9-3 shows estimation results for all covariates, for the main 1992 sam-
ple that uses self-reported pension data. The evidence indicates that 37 per-
cent of the SR sample invested in the stock market, and the average of the
unconditional share of nonpension financial wealth invested was 19 per-
cent. The control variables in Table 9-3 generally have the expected signs
in the Probit and Tobit specifications. Stock market investment rises with
wealth and income. While the effect of employer-provided pension wealth
was relatively small, the effect of net nonpension wealth was substantial—
being in the top quartile of the wealth distribution significantly raises the
likelihood of investing in the stock market by 50 percentage points, relative
to the bottom quartile. Meanwhile, being in the top 5 percent of the labor
income distribution significantly raises the likelihood by 35 percentage
points. Being in the most risk-averse category (consisting of about two-
thirds of the sample) significantly reduces the likelihood of investing in
the stock market by 5.5 percentage points. Households with older men are
less likely to invest in the stock market, with the probability falling by a little
Table 9-3 Estimation Results, Basic Specification
Independent Variables Holds any Stock
Outside Pension
(Probit)
Share of Nonpension
Financial Wealth Held
in Stock (Tobit)
Marginal
Effect
Standard
Error
Coefficient Standard
Error
Pension type (omitted: DB-only)
DC-only 0.1332∗∗ 0.0569 0.1507∗ 0.0825
DB & DC 0.1001∗∗∗ 0.0341 0.1328∗∗∗ 0.0497
DC plan offers choice 0.0040 0.0623 0.0451 0.0914
Years in pension plan
DB 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0015 0.0047∗∗ 0.0022
DC 0.0010 0.0021 0.0011 0.0031
DC plan offers choice 0.0005 0.0045 0.0001 0.0063
Employer pension wealth, second quartile 0.0710∗ 0.0376 0.1174∗∗ 0.0554
Third quartile 0.0827∗ 0.0402 0.1462∗∗ 0.0584
Top quartile −0.0401 0.0433 −0.0290 0.0661
Net nonpension wealth, second quartile 0.2033∗∗∗ 0.0295 0.3175∗∗∗ 0.0456
Third quartile 0.3321∗∗∗ 0.0349 0.4747∗∗∗ 0.0531
Top quartile 0.5028∗∗∗ 0.0399 0.6362∗∗∗ 0.0727
Labor income, second quartile 0.0006 0.0288 0.0102 0.0436
Third quartile 0.0483 0.0399 0.1162∗∗ 0.0568
Top 75–95% 0.1405∗ 0.0756 0.2420∗∗ 0.0956
Top 95–100% 0.3523∗∗∗ 0.1114 0.3165∗∗ 0.1251
Other noncapital income, second quartile −0.0295 0.0333 −0.0174 0.0500
Third quartile 0.0354 0.0373 0.0768 0.0542
Top 75–95% 0.1138∗∗ 0.0569 0.1904∗∗ 0.0756
Top 95–100% 0.2103∗∗ 0.0939 0.1755 0.1155
Occupation is unskilled 0.0154 0.0331 0.0115 0.0500
Skilled 0.0326 0.0328 0.0249 0.0489
Married −0.1750 0.1462 −0.2950 0.2036
Age, husband −0.0073∗∗ 0.0033 −0.0110∗∗ 0.0049
Age, wife 0.0034 0.0025 0.0058∗ 0.0037
Risk averse −0.0547∗∗ 0.0257 −0.0326 0.0374
Education < high school −0.0599∗ 0.0338 −0.0645 0.0546
Attended college 0.0545∗ 0.0305 0.0956∗∗ 0.0456
Black −0.1354∗∗∗ 0.0349 −0.2124∗∗∗ 0.0638
Hispanic −0.1314∗∗∗ 0.0456 −0.1533∗ 0.0853
Constant — — −0.1306 0.2775
Û — — 0.6278 0.0192
Log-likelihood/N −0.5432 −0.6628
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 1992 HRS.
Notes: Pension type and other information is self-reported (SR), 1992 data. The sample
includes households in which a male works, is not self-employed, and reports having a
pension, and which have positive net nonpension wealth and answer all questions about
the information reported above. Sample size is 1950. See Table 9-1 notes and text for more
information.
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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under a percentage point for each year of age. Households with older wives
are more likely to invest, with a smaller effect in absolute value. Hispanics
and blacks are significantly and substantially less likely to invest in the stock
market.
Next, we turn to a discussion of key pension variables. People with DC
plans (whether DC-only or DB and DC) are significantly more likely—
10–13 percentage points—to invest in the stock market, relative to having a
DB-only plan. These effects become a little smaller if years-in-plan variables
are excluded, in results that are not shown. Meanwhile, in the Tobit spec-
ification these variables lose a little significance but have a slightly greater
effect on the desired share of wealth invested in stocks. The other main
finding is that years in a DB plan (whether DB-only or DB and DC) also
has a statistically significant and positive effect on stock market investment.
Each year in a DB plan raises the likelihood of investing in stocks by
0.39 percentage points (standard error of 0.15), or 3.9 percentage points
for each 10 years—this amounts to a little over 10 percent of the sample
mean rate of stock market investment. In the Tobit specification, each
year in a DB plan raises the desired share of wealth in the stock market
by 0.48 percentage points.17 By contrast, the effect of years in a DC plan
(whether DC-only or DB and DC) is virtually 0; notably, if we control for
years on a job, it does not affect the results. Finally, it is interesting that
we do not observe any statistically significant or substantive effect on stock
market investment of having investment choices in a DC plan. This occurs
whether we assume a constant effect or allow it to vary by years in a plan
with choice.
To sum up, we find that workers with DC pensions invested more in the
stock market, but independently of how long they have been in their plans.
This suggests the presence of either endogenous sorting or an immediate
learning effect from DC plans—unfortunately, we are not able to distin-
guish which. Moreover, the effect of having a DC plan will be overstated,
relative to having a DB plan, if people with a greater taste for investing in
stocks are more likely to contribute and hence be classified in the first place
as having a DC plan. Finally, we find that workers with DB pensions invested
more in the stock market over time. As we argued earlier, the presence
of endogenous mobility would lead us to underestimate the true effect of
years in a DB plan.
Additional 1992 Subsamples
Table 9-4 shows the estimated marginal effects for the key pension variables
for various subsamples of the 1992 data that distinguish between self- and
employer-reported pension information; this distinction is not possible
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using 2004 data. We include the years-in-plan variables, although these
effects are more difficult to interpret when we use ER data. Employers do
not report years in a plan, so we have interacted the ER plan type with the
maximum years in a plan reported by the individual.
The 1992 ER sample, which has pension data provided by employers,
consists of about two-thirds of the full SR sample. The effects of pensions,
shown in the top panel of Table 9-4 on the left, are similar in magnitude and
significance to the SR results discussed above. Having a DC pension raises
the likelihood of stock market investment by 6–14 percentage points, and
each year in a DB plan significantly raises the likelihood by 0.48 percentage
points, a bigger effect than before.
Notably, the effects of pensions are much stronger in the 1992 subsample
in which the same pension type is reported by the worker and employer. In
this ‘agree’ subsample, shown in the top panel of Table 9-4 on the right,
the effect of having a DC plan is particularly large. People in DC-only plans
are 21.1 percentage points (standard error of 11.7) more likely to invest
in the stock market than people in DB-only plans, while people in DB and
DC plans are 32.1 percentage points (11.6) more likely. The effect of years
in a DB plan (again, DB-only or DB and DC) is also larger, with each year
raising the likelihood by 0.83 (0.32) percentage points. The length of time
in a DC plan is positive and not that much smaller but insignificant, at 0.68
(0.51) percentage points, and this is considerably larger than for the full
SR sample.
The estimated effects of pensions may be greater in the ‘agree’ group for
two reasons. People who know their pension type reveal themselves to be
more financially savvy and, perhaps, more responsive to pension incentives.
However, they may also be more interested in the stock market. Thus,
the very large estimated effects of pension type raise extra concern about
endogenous selection.
Interestingly, people who are misinformed about their pension type
respond to their self-reported pension information sometimes significantly,
but less strongly, in results shown in the middle panel of Table 9-4 on the
left. In contrast, the estimated effects for the same confused sample when
we instead use ER information, in the middle panel on the right, are always
statistically insignificant and small.
2004 Sample
The bottom panel of Table 9-4 shows the estimated marginal effects using
self-reported pension data for the WB and EBB cohorts in 2004. The
estimation results are similar in a key respect to the 1992 results but are
different in other interesting ways. The differential between the estimated
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effects of tenure in DB versus DC plans remains similar—in both samples,
stock market participation is significantly higher as years in a DB plan rise,
relative to years in a DC plan. Once again, this suggests that DB plans grow
relatively less risky, compared to DC plans, as workers approach retirement
and thus gain DB pension wealth accruals.
In addition, the absolute magnitudes of the year-in-plan estimates for
2004 have changed in important, revealing ways. Both estimated years-in-
plan effects are substantially smaller than they were in 1992, now indicating
a 0.08 percentage point increase (standard error of 2.2) in the likelihood
of investing in the stock market for each year in a DB plan and a 0.49 (2.7)
percentage point decrease for each year in a DC plan.
The substantial reductions in these estimated effects suggest there was
a jump in the risk that people perceive as accumulating over time in both
types of pensions. This is not surprising given recent developments. Reports
of employers underfunding, freezing, or terminating DB plans have grown
common in the last few years, and many plans in some key sectors of the
economy have been turned over to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Cor-
poration (PBGC). The PBGC pays off obligations based only on years of
service accumulated to date, so many workers lose out on substantial future
accruals that they expect; also the maximum payout is capped so that highly
compensated employees are only partially insured. Meanwhile, DC plan
holders today have had considerable recent experience with stock market
volatility. The last finding of note is that people in DC plans with choice
invest increasingly in the stock market over time, though the estimated
effect falls a little short of statistical significance. This gives stronger support
than the 1992 data did to the idea that DC plans may help reduce barriers
to stock market participation.
Understanding DB Pension Risks
We complete the analysis by quantifying the risks associated with early exit
from DB pensions. The expected loss from early exit depends on two
factors—how much pension wealth is at risk (which we compute in the
1992 HRS), and the incidence of unexpected job loss. The latter is difficult
to quantify, since we do not observe individual expectations. Instead, we
simply used information about reasons for leaving one’s job for the original
HRS cohort observed in subsequent years. Table 9-5 shows some illustrative
results. For people in a DB pension at the outset of the HRS, it shows DB
pension wealth at risk by age in 1992 and subsequent reasons for job exits
by age. The median pension wealth at risk is very substantial for workers in
their early 50s and declines sharply with age. The median loss in pension
wealth if someone leaves his job at age 51 is 61.4 percent of total pension
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Table 9-5 Pension Wealth at Risk in Defined Benefit Plans, 1992 HRS
Age % of Job Exits Due to Loss in Pension Wealth
if Job Ends Now
Actual Loss Due to
Involuntary Dismissals
Involuntary
Dismissal
Poor
Health
Median ($) % of Total
Pension Wealth
Median ($)
51 2.1 1.3 57,163 61.4 65,594
52 0.8 1.5 54,590 56.8 41,172
53 1.4 2.0 46,312 52.6 36,214
54 0.8 0.6 40,949 47.3 55,910
55 1.0 1.0 31,783 39.4 53,670
56 1.4 1.0 27,616 34.6 11,546
57 0.9 0.7 23,398 29.4 63,820
58 1.7 1.6 19,496 23.0 15,592
59 0.6 1.4 14,705 10.9 14,898
60 1.7 1.5 9,366 11.7 10,071
61 1.4 1.4 7,914 9.1 5,354
62 1.0 2.0 5,854 6.9 3,616
63 1.0 1.0 5,175 6.3 3,413
64 2.0 1.0 4,024 5.4 2,126
65 1.9 1.9 1,829 2.8 2,075
66 0.0 0.8 3,585 4.4 0
Source: Authors’ calculations from the HRS, 1992–2002.
Notes: Sample: all men in jobs with a defined benefit pension in 1992. Sample size is 1,852.
Definitions: pension wealth equals the real present value of an employee’s expected future
pension benefits, if the employee leaves the job at the age shown on the horizontal axis.
Involuntary dismissals are those in which the individual said that he or she quit, had been
laid off, or would have been laid off had he not quit.
wealth ($57,163). The median falls to $31,783 at age 55 and $9,336 at
age 60.18 On the other hand, the rate of involuntary job loss is low, at
around 1–2 percent per year among people who started the year in the
job, and does not show a clear age-related pattern.19 Another 1–2 percent
per year left their job at each age because of poor health or disability, which
might also be considered by voluntary. While the rate of involuntary job loss
might be low, the consequences are severe, as shown in the final column.
The median pension loss suffered due to involuntary exits is $65,594 at age
51, and it declines rapidly, falling to $10,071 at age 60.
Conclusions and Discussion
The shift from DB to DC plans over the last two decades has led to
important changes in risks borne by workers in their pensions. Employers
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make investment choices and bear capital market risks associated with those
choices in DB plans, while workers bear capital market risks in DC plans.
Of course, many DB pensions also carry the risk of a substantial loss in
pension wealth resulting from an unexpectedly early exit from one’s job or
from termination and bankruptcy. When we consider the impact of these
changes in pension structure on the risks workers are willing to absorb in
their investment choices outside of their pensions, the main results show
significant and substantial differences in stock market investment among
workers, depending on their pension characteristics. The longer workers
are in their DB plans, the riskier the investments they make outside of
their pensions. In comparison, workers with DC plans invest more in the
stock market overall—yet this effect is independent of how long they have
been in their plans.20 This pattern suggests that workers with a greater
preference for risk (who would invest more in the stock market anyway)
sort themselves into jobs with DC pensions. Importantly, this type of sorting
would bias against estimating a positive effect on stock market investment
of years in a DB plan, since if anything workers staying longer in jobs with
DB plans should be more risk averse, according to the sorting hypothesis.
In the more recent data, we find a similar differential in the estimated
effects of tenure in DB versus DC plans, so once again it appears that DB
plans grow relatively less risky, compared to DC plans, as workers approach
retirement and thus gain DB pension wealth accruals. In addition, the
absolute magnitudes of the year-in-plan estimates in 2004 have shrunk,
suggesting that there was a jump in the risk that people perceive as accu-
mulating over time in both types of pensions.
This research illustrates another of the myriad consequences of the shift
in pension structure, which may also alter patterns of job mobility at young
and older ages and consumption after retirement. We identify some effects
of the shift in investment risk from employers to workers, as well as recent
changes in those risks. Moreover, our conclusions shed light on important
policy concerns. Some reform proposals would replace at least a portion of
traditional Social Security benefits, which have characteristics of DB plans,
with personal accounts, which have characteristics of DC plans, thereby
shifting investment risk onto workers. Our results indicate that individu-
als might respond to the jump in risk by reallocating their nonpension
portfolios, reducing the boost in retirement wealth which is expected from
personal account.
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Notes
1 Statistics on both pension and stock market trends are computed from the SCF.
Also using the SCF, Poterba (2001) reported that the share of the adult popula-
tion owning stock outside of employer-provided pensions in taxable accounts rose
from 31.8 to 48.5 percent between 1989 and 1998, and the share owning stock in
Individual Retirement Accounts rose from 10.3 to 20.9 percent.
2 The pension plans in Figure 9-1 were slightly altered to protect confidentiality
(see Friedberg and Webb 2005).
3 Cash balance plans are hybrids. Workers accrue a notional contribution and
rate of return which may be fixed or tied to economic indicators or company
performance, in which case they share the investment risk. Funds are portable after
vesting, but the account does not actually exist, and employers follow DB funding
rules and bear some or all of the investment risk. They were not common during
the 1992 HRS (US General Accounting Office 2000).
4 Pensions involve other risks as well, but they are less important for our analysis.
Both DB and DC plans generally compound risk which workers face in their future
earnings. DB pension wealth generally depends on one’s last or highest years of
earnings, while the whole path of earnings may determine DC contributions. This
source of risk in both types of plans also diminishes over time as the uncertain path
of earnings is realized, while in DC pensions it is converted into investment risk. The
risk of uncertain life spans is usually borne by employers in DB plans since most DB
benefits are annuitized, and by workers in DC plans since most DC benefits are not
(Brown et al. 1999). We can control for this risk in our estimation and simulations
because the HRS reports data on subjective life expectancy. Finally, workers face a
risk that their employer’s DB pension fund may become insolvent, but their benefits
are partially insured by the PBGC. The PBGC guarantees the pension earned at the
time of insolvency up to a maximum amount, so it does not shield workers from the
early departure risk that we already discussed. The guaranteed amount depends on
age and survivorship; for a pension with no survivor benefit payable at age 65, the
monthly limit in 2005 was $3,801.
5 Another explanation is that the stock market boom of the late 1990s altered
perceptions, rightly or wrongly, about the riskiness of the stock market, relative
to expected returns. Since our estimation uses data from 1992, concerns about a
bubble driving up participation are absent.
6 Income earned on assets in DC plans is taxed on withdrawal rather than when it
is earned. This deferral reduces the effective tax rate and also gives some leeway to
time withdrawals to coincide with years when the marginal tax rate is low.
7 Taxing capital gains only on realization reduces the effective tax rate on long-
held equity. In addition to that, long-term gains (usually defined as a year or more)
have been further favored since 1991. The maximum marginal tax rates in 1992
were 31 percent on other income and 28 percent on capital gains, so the differential
was small; maximum rates in 2004 were 35 and 15 percent, with the latter applying
to dividend income as well.
8 We do not extend our focus here to real responses, because DB and DC pen-
sions differ in other important ways that directly affect saving and retirement
behavior and may only affect portfolio allocations indirectly, while the differences
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in risk should affect portfolio allocations directly and other real behavior only
indirectly.
9 For example, Rohwedder et al. (2004) argued that asset levels in many categories
were substantially understated when the initial AHEAD cohort of the HRS was
surveyed in 1993, leading to overestimates of saving in subsequent years.
10 Many of the econometric issues we confront are noted in Miniaci and Weber
(2002) and Poterba and Samwick (2003).
11 Alternately, we could study the allocation of the entire portfolio including pen-
sions. This would be more difficult because the HRS reports only whether DC plans
are invested ‘mostly in stock, mostly in bonds, or both’.
12 Except in the case of variables related to number of years in a pension plan and
to total pension wealth, we use data from the RAND HRS data files in the interests
of comparability with other studies. We obtained very similar estimates for our 1992
sample when using either source of data, obtained from the HRS directly or from
RAND.
13 Some respondents refused to give permission, and some employers failed to
reply. We do not know whether workers who report not having a pension (and
whom we omit from our data) actually have one, since employers were not con-
tacted in that case. Gustman and Steinmeier (1999) estimated that the likelihood
that the HRS obtained employer data rose significantly with education, firm size,
self-reported pension wealth, and working in a nonmanufacturing firm, and fell
with wealth and earnings. However, the overall explanatory power of these variables
was low, so we treat the availability of employer data as exogenous.
14 Data on pension wealth computed from both self-reported and ER data has
been provided by researchers through the HRS/AHEAD website (Anonymous 1998;
Peticolas and Steinmeier 1999).
15 They may have difficulty separating preferences for risk and for other character-
istics of their current job in answering the question. The SCF question that Poterba
and Samwick (2003) and Weisbenner (2002) used asked whether respondents were
willing to take more or less risk to get a greater or smaller expected return.
16 Among those with a pension, the most common missing data was pension type,
other information needed to determine pension wealth, and risk preferences.
17 As an alternative to assuming a normal distribution and estimating a Tobit,
we tried censored quantile regression (CQR; Guiso et al. 1996). Unlike censored
least absolute deviations (Powell 1984), CQR is possible when the median itself is
censored, as it is in this case. Stata code to estimate CQR was written by Moreira
for Chay and Powell (2001). However, the estimation did not converge, suggesting
that the model does not explain portfolio allocations in the upper quantiles very
well.
18 The level of pension wealth at any age is sensitive to the assumed interest rate,
and we assume a 1.9 percent real rate. The pattern of decline through the 50s is not
sensitive to this assumption.
19 We classify a quit as involuntary if someone said that he or she quit, had been
laid off, or would have been laid off had he not quit. Other possible reasons for job
exit include family care, better job, or retired.
20 For a related study in the Swedish context, see Karlsson et al. (this volume).
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